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Introduction 
The Gulf of Mexico penaeid shrimp 
fishery is one of the most valuable fish­
eries in the United States in terms of 
ex-vessel value, and Texas has tradi­
tionally led all Gulf states in ex-vessel 
value of shrimp landed. The total im­
pact on the Texas economy, including 
multiplier effects, is about $580 mil-
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ABSTRACT-Management of the Texas 
penaeid shrimp fishery is aimed at increas­
ing revenue from brown shrimp, Penaeus 
aztecus, landings and decreasing the level 
of discards. Since 1960 Texas has closed 
its territorial sea for 45-60 days during 
peak migration ofbrown shrimp to the Gulf 
ofMexico. In 1981 the closure was extended 
to 200 miles to include the U.S. Exclusive 
Economic Zone. Simulation modeling is 
used in this paper to estimate the changes 
in landings, revenue, costs, and economic 
rent attributable to the Texas closure. Four 
additional analyses were conducted to esti­
mate the effects of closing the Gulf 1- to 
4-fathom zone for 45 and 60 days, with 
and without effort redirected to inshore wa­
ters. Distributional impacts are analyzed 
in terms of costs, revenues, and rents, by 
vessel class, shrimp species, vessel owner, 
and crew. 
54(3),1993 
lion annually with the fishery employ­
ing some 20,000 fishermen (Cody et 
aI., 1989). The Texas shrimp fishery 
relies primarily on brown shrimp, 
Penaeus aztecus, and white shrimp, P. 
setiferus. The life cycle of shrimp 
makes them both estuarine- and Gulf­
dependent; thus, two distinct harvest­
ing fleets have evolved, inshore and off­
shore. 
An important aspect of the inshore 
fishery relates to the function of bays 
in the life cycle of shrimp. Penaeid 
shrimp spawn in the Gulf of Mexico 
and larvae are carried into estuaries. 
During the early stages of shrimp 
growth, marshes and shallow bay ar­
eas serve as nursery grounds. As juve­
nile shrimp grow and mature, they emi­
grate offshore to the open waters of 
the Gulf. 
The timing and duration of this cycle 
differs between species, but the major 
harvesting implications remain the 
same. During bay shrimping seasons, 
small shrimp found in shallow bays and 
near-offshore areas are subjected to har­
vest by inshore commercial (food and 
bait) and recreational fishermen before 
they move to deeper water and become 
available to the offshore fleet. The off­
shore fleet is characterized by large ves­
sels capable of staying offshore for long 
periods of time. They target larger 
shrimp that roam deeper waters, and 
the amount of shrimp available to them 
is partially a function of the inshore 
harvest. 
Since 1960, Texas has enacted a 45­
to 60-day closure of its territorial sea 
from the 4-fathom depth contour to 
9 n.mi. from shore during peak migra­
tion of brown shrimp to the Gulf of 
Mexico. In 1981, as mandated by the 
Gulf of Mexico Shrimp Management 
Plan, the Texas closure was extended 
to 200 n.mi. to include the U.S. Exclu­
sive Economic Zone (EEZ)I. During 
this closure, however, the shallow off­
shore area from the shoreline to 4 fath­
oms deep was left open to white shrimp 
fishing. The economic thrust behind the 
closure is to increase the value of the 
brown shrimp harvest by protecting 
brown shrimp until they reach a larger, 
more valuable size, as well as to re­
duce waste through discarding. In con­
junction with the 200-mile closure, the 
Texas Legislature repealed the count 
laws to reduce discarding. 
The Texas Legislature historically 
has managed the fishery to maximize 
ex-vessel value of shrimp landed (Cody 
et aI., 1989). In 1985 the Texas Parks 
and Wildlife Commission was granted 
authority to regulate the shrimp fishery 
in Texas's bays and territorial sea. The 
Texas Shrimp Fishery Management 
Plan was adopted in 1989, and in 1990 
the 4-fathom offshore area, previously 
left open to white shrimp fishing, was 
c1osed2 • 
Since 1981, the year the EEZ closure 
regulation began, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) has annually 
assessed the effects of the closure in 
terms of size distribution of shrimp, 
catch patterns in the fishery, overall 
'In 1986, 1987, and 1988, the Texas closure was 
modified to extend to only 15 n.mi. 
'There has been speculation that leaving the 4­
fathom zone open could have detrimental effects 
on the overall fishery for the following reasons: 
I) Enforcement of the closure is more difficult 
with this depth zone left open, 2) one-third of all 
brown shrimp discards are coming from the 
4-fathom zone during the closure months, and 
3) excess pressure on spawning white shrimp 
may have caused a reduction in recruitment of 
white shrimp to the fishery (data indicate a de­
cline in white shrimp recruitment in Texas wa­
ters since 1981 (Cody et aI., 1989) ). 
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yield, and value of landings associated 
with changes in yield (Klima et a!., 
1983-85; Nichols, 1983-85, 1987; and 
Poffenberger, 1982, 1984, 1986a,b,c). 
NMFS uses the results for a given year 
the closure is in effect, and simulates 
for that year what landings would have 
been if there had been no closure. In 
contrast to the yearly evaluations con­
ducted by NMFS, this study uses simu­
lated average fishery conditions for the 
pre-closure period (1963-80) and com­
pares the results to a closure (1981-85) 
simulation average, holding all environ­
mental conditions constant. In other 
words, this analysis compares a simu­
lated pre-closure average to a simulated 
closure average. 
The purpose of this study was to ana­
lyze the economic effects of the 200­
mile Texas closure as well as the eco­
nomic effects of a total offshore closure 
including the 4-fathom zone. Distribu­
tional impacts were examined in terms 
of costs, revenue, and rent, by vessel 
class, shrimp species, vessel owner, and 
crew. Because the closure can range 
from 45 to 60 days, depending on bio­
logical conditions in the fishery, this 
study examined the effects of closing 
the fishery for the minimum and maxi­
mum number of days. Simulations also 
were run with and without effort redi­
rected to inshore waters; the Texas clo­
sure caused a redirection of effort into 
the 4-fathom zone offshore, and it is 
expected that closing the 4-fathom zone 
will prompt a redirection of effort to 
inshore waters. Compliance of 100% 
was assumed (i.e., no illegal effort) when 
the 4-fathom zone was closed because 
shrimp vessels would have no reason to 
be in offshore waters and enforcement 
of the closure would be more effective. 
The policies analyzed are as follows: 
1) 200-mile, 45-day closure, with 
the 4-fathom zone open; 
2) 200-mile, 45-day closure, with 
the 4-fathom zone closed3; 
3) 200-mile, 45-day closure, with 
the 4-fathom zone closed and effort re­
directed inshore; 
4) 200-mile, 60-day closure, with 
the 4-fathom zone closed; 
'Because this study was conducted prior to imple­
mentation of the 4-fathom zone closure. 1981­
85 fishing patterns were used. 
5) 200-mile, 60-day closure, with 
the 4-fathom zone closed and effort re­
directed inshore. 
Methodology 
Model Description 
The General Bioeconomic Fishery 
Simulation Model (GBFSM) was de­
veloped specifically for annual crop 
fisheries, and it is particularly appli­
cable to the Gulf shrimp fishery (Grant 
et a!., 1981; Griffin and Grant, 1982). 
The simulation model, or adaptations 
of GBFSM, have been used in several 
practical applications prior to this 
analysis (Blomo et a!., 1982; Blomo et 
aI., 1978; Griffin et a!., 1979, 1981, 
1990; Griffin and Grant, 1982). In the 
GBFSM, effects are assessed in terms 
of total harvest-species, size class, and 
seasonal distribution of the harvest; to­
tal revenue, total costs, and rent in the 
fishery; and distribution of revenue, 
costs, and rent among different classes 
of fishing vessels. 
The user may select any number of 
species, size classes, fishing areas, 
depths, and vessel classes for inclusion 
in the model. The time-step, extent, and 
resolution of model output are also vari­
able. The model is currently set with 8 
fishing areas, 6 shrimp size classes, and 
3 vessel classes (Table I). The model 
is also set with 144 time steps, i.e., the 
model goes through its cycle-recruit­
ment, growth, movement, mortality­
144 times per year, or about once ev­
ery 2.5 days. 
The biological submodel represents 
recruitment of new organisms into the 
fishery by species, area, and time frame. 
Table 1.-Characteristics 01 categories into which 
shrimp vessels. shrimp landings. and lishing areas 
were placed lor modeling purposes. 
Fishing areas 
Cate­ (Depth Shrimp 
gory infm) (No.llb) Vessels 
<1 (Nursery) <20 Unregistered, 
inshore 
2 <1 (Bays) 20-30 Registered, 
Texas based' 
3 1-5 31-50 Registered, non-
Texas based' 
4 6-10 51-67 
5 11-15 68-116 
6 16-20 117-160 
7 21 -25 
8 >25 
'Usually less than 55 feet in length. 
'Usually greater than 55 feet in length. 
Organisms grow and move from one 
size class to another and mortality re­
sults from both natural causes and 
fishing. Bait and recreational fishing 
occur within the model in inshore 
depths only. The model represents 
fishing effort exerted on each species 
by vessel class, depth zone, area, and 
time frame. Nominal days fished are 
exogenous to the model and are con­
verted to real days fished based on the 
relative fishing power of vessels in­
volved. The economic submodel rep­
resents monetary costs of fishing, value 
of harvest, and rent to the fishery. The 
economic submodel is built on top of 
the biological submodel and calculates 
economic effects based upon the bio­
logical effects of any proposed man­
agement strategy put into the model. 
Reported shrimp landings for 1963­
85 were obtained from NMFS master 
files. These data are categorized into 
landings by area, species, size class, 
depth zone, and month for the entire 
23-year period except 1969 and 1984; 
these years were excluded because ef­
fort data was incomplete when this study 
was undertaken. Nominal days fished 
were derived from the effort expansion 
data developed by Nichols (NMFS 
Pascagoula Laboratory) and were cat­
egorized by area, species, vessel class, 
depth zone, and time period. Given these 
data, it is possible to tune and validate 
the model by comparing model simula­
tions to historical landings. 
Model Thning and Validation 
Tuning the model requires the bio­
logical coefficients in the model to be 
set to the best estimate of values (ob­
tained from Cody et a!., 1989, and the 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department!) 
and then adjusted until the tuned model 
depicts reality. The first step is to use 
average effort patterns and levels from 
the NMFS data set for the pre-closure 
period (1963-80) to generate average 
landings for the same period. These 
landings are expressed as total landings, 
landings by month, landings by depth 
zone, and landings by size class for both 
brown and white shrimp. The various 
4Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. 4200 
Smith School Road. Austin. TX. 78744. Unpubl. 
data. 
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biological coefficients within the model 
are then adjusted (within the range of 
realistic possibilities) until the simulated 
landings match the historical average in 
terms of depth zone, size class, seasonal 
distribution, and total landings. 
The first step in model validation is 
to test the tuned model against a time 
period not used in the tuning process. 
Average effort patterns and levels for 
the 1981-85 period are inserted into 
the tuned model and the average land­
ings generated are compared to reported 
average landings for the closure period. 
The second step in validation indi­
cates how well the model depicts land­
ings over the range of effort levels ac­
tually exerted between 1963 and 1985. 
The model is run through a 21-year 
simulation with the actual effort for 
each year (1963-85) imposed. All bio­
logical coefficients remain constant. 
This procedure generates a yield plot 
of landings (with environmental con­
ditions held constant) for the 21-year 
period which is compared to actual data 
points to determine how well simulated 
landingS' fit within the range of actual 
data points. The tuning and validation 
process was carried out individually for 
brown and white shrimp5. 
Policy Analysis 
The analysis presented herein is a 
short-run analysis that estimates the ef­
fects the closure had on landings, rev­
enue, costs, and rent to the shrimp 
fishery. To measure the effects of the 
closure and avoid capturing the effects 
of different effort levels, effort must be 
held constant throughout the analysis. 
Figure I helps illustrate this point. The 
200-mile closure forced a change in the 
offshore shrimp fleet's fishing patterns. 
Yield curve Y I is assumed to be the 
yield curve before the closure, and Y2 
is the yield curve after the closure. The 
question is, what effect did the closure 
have on landings, revenue, costs, and 
rent to the fishery, omitting the effects 
of different effort levels. Movement 
from A to B in Figure 1 represents a 
change in landings due to an increase in 
'The results of tuning and validating the model 
are too lengthy to present here. They are re­
ported in Griffin et al. (1990) and will be pro­
vided by the author upon request. 
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Landings 
Effort 
Y2 
E2E1 
Figure I.-Comparison of differ­
ent fishing patterns at equal total 
effort levels. 
effort from E I to E2 under the pre-clo­
sure scenario, whereas movement from 
B to C represents a change in landings 
due to a policy change at a given level 
of effort. The change in landings induced 
by a change in policy, and the conse­
quent effects on revenue, cost, and rent, 
while holding effort constant, is the sub­
ject of this paper. 
To compare economic rent between 
the pre-closure and closure offshore 
fishing patterns, the pre-closure simu­
lation is set to economic equilibrium, 
i.e., rent is zero. This is accomplished 
by establishing the appropriate variable 
costs by vessel class6, then adjusting 
fixed costs (including opportunity 
costs) until rent to vessel owners is 
equal to zero. Figure 2 represents the 
theoretical framework upon which this 
process is based. The R1 curve repre­
sents the revenue curve associated with 
the pre-closure offshore fishing pat­
terns. Because this analysis assumes an 
equilibrium position for the pre-closure 
offshore fishing patterns, total costs rep­
resented by Cl must equal Rl at effort 
level E2. This implies rent is zero. The 
closure affects revenue and cost as 
shown by curves R2 and C2, respec­
tively. Cost is affected by the closure 
because crew shares and packing 
charges are calculated as a percentage 
of landings; if landings increase, so do 
crew shares and packing charges. The 
closure causes revenue to increase from 
B to C, costs to increase from B to D, 
and rent is measured from D to C. 
Because effort levels in the pre­
closure and closure periods were not the 
6Because out-of-state vessels spend a limited 
amount of time in Texas, all costs for vessel 
class 3 were categorized as variable. 
$ 
E2 Effort 
Figure 2.-Setting of zero rents 
to each vessel class (economic 
equilibrium) for base simulation. 
same (Table 2), the effort level in the 
pre-closure period was set to the effort 
level of the closure period by the fol­
lowing procedure. Days fished for brown 
shrimp in the inshore area increased sub­
stantially over the entire period consid­
ered (1963-85). This increase in days 
fished is assumed to be unrelated to the 
closure because it began before the clo­
sure was implemented and would have 
continued with or without the closure. 
Therefore, inshore effort was held con­
stant at the 1981-85 level for both the 
pre-closure and closure periods7. Envi­
ronmental conditions, unit price re­
ceived, and unit costs of fishing also 
were held constant. 
The average offshore effort level was 
greater in the closure period (1981-85) 
than in the pre-closure period (1963­
80). In the offshore area, average days 
Table 2.-Average days fished for brown and while 
shrimp. 
Brown shrimp White shrimp 
Days Days Days Days 
fished fished fished fished 
Years inshore offshore inshore offshore 
1963-80 2,458 44,679 7.698 12,567 
1976-80 4,008 49.510 8.158 13.551 
1981-85 9.935 46,150 9.623 16.296 
'The closure may have had a dampening effect 
on Inshore effort expansion because some effort 
may have been redirected inshore by smaller 
boats (Nance et aI., 1991). Because large vessels 
could fish in the 1-4 fathom area offshore dur­
ing the closu~e, increased crowding in the 1-4 
fathom area forced smaller boats into the inshore 
area. However, for this analysis, fishing patterns
and effort levels were held constant for the in­
shore area in both the pre-closure and closure 
periods. 
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fished for brown shrimp in 1981-85 
increased by 1,471 over the 1963-80 
average. Average days fished for white 
shrimp in the offshore area increased 
also, particularly in June and July (Grif­
fin et aI., 1990) because the 1-4 fathom 
area offshore was left open to white 
shrimp harvesting during the closure. 
Offshore fishing patterns for the 1963­
80 period were held constant but the 
level of effort was inflated to the aver­
age 1981-85 offshore effort level. 
Results 
200-mile, 45-day Closure, 
4-fathom Zone Open 
Fishing Patterns 
Total fishing effort for both brown 
and white shrimp increased from the 
pre-closure to closure periods (Table 
3). Brown shrimp effort in the inshore 
area (depth zone 2) increased by a fac­
tor of 4, and brown shrimp effort in 
the offshore depths shifted from depth 
6 (16-20 fathoms) to depth 8 (>25 fath­
oms). When effort in the pre-closure 
period was inflated to closure levels 
and compared to the closure period 
(Table 3), total effort was the same but 
the distribution of effort between brown 
and white shrimp changed. The aver­
age number of days fished for brown 
shrimp declined by 2,000 days, and the 
average number of days fished for 
white shrimp increased by 2,000 days. 
Vessels that had been fishing in the EEZ 
from mid-May through mid-July in the 
pre-closure period now must either fish 
in the EEZ illegally, fish off other Gulf 
states, fish in Mexican waters illegally, 
not fish at all, or redirect effort to in­
shore areas to fish for brown shrimp, 
Table 3.-Average days fished for all vessels. 
Brown shrimp 
or to the 4-fathom zone offshore to fish 
for white shrimp. Effort on brown 
shrimp was reduced overall, though 
some of that effort was redirected to 
white shrimp, particularly in June when 
there was a shift from depth 4 (6-10 
fathoms) to depth 3 (1-5 fathoms). 
Fishermen apparently spent more time 
fishing for white shrimp when the EEZ 
was closed than when it was open. 
Brown Shrimp Landings 
Annual brown shrimp landings in­
creased from 33.8 million pounds in 
the pre-closure simulation to 35.4 mil­
lion pounds in the closure simulation 
(Table 4). Landings of medium sized 
shrimp (sizes 3 and 4) decreased in the 
closure simulation, whereas landings of 
large sized shrimp (sizes I and 2) in­
creased. Landings of the smallest 
shrimp (sizes 5 and 6 ) also increased 
in the closure simulation, probably due 
to rescission of the count laws. The 
increase in landings of small shrimp 
accounted for most of the increase in 
total landings. The closure simulation 
also revealed a reduction in discards. 
Brown shrimp discards generated by 
the pre-closure simulation were 2.4 mil­
lion pounds, compared to 0.76 million 
pounds under the closure simulation. 
To distinguish between changes in 
landings and discards attributable to the 
closure and changes attributable to 
elimination of the count laws, two ad­
ditional simulations were performed: A 
simulation with closure effort patterns 
and the old count laws in effect (65 
whole shrimp per pound) and a simu­
lation with pre-closure effort patterns 
and no count laws. Compared to the 
pre-closure simulation with the count 
laws, the closure simulation with count 
laws produced virtually no change in 
total landings, but landings were dis­
tributed toward the larger, more valu­
able size classes. A small reduction in 
discards resulted from reduced effort 
during the 45-day closure. The pre­
closure simulation with no count laws 
produced a 2-million-pound increase in 
total landings (compared to the pre­
closure simulation with count laws), but 
this increase occurred in the smallest 
size classes; there was no redistribu­
tion of the harvest toward larger size 
shrimp. Discards were virtually elimi­
nated, which translated to increased 
landings of smaller shrimp. These simu­
lations indicate that the closure resulted 
in redistribution of the brown shrimp 
harvest from mid-sized shrimp to large 
shrimp, and elimination of the count 
laws resulted in a substantial reduction 
of discards. 
White Shrimp Landings 
Simulations for white shrimp pro­
duced an increase in total landings in 
the closure period. Pre-closure effort 
patterns landed 11.49 million pounds 
of white shrimp compared to the clo­
sure effort patterns which landed 12.97 
million pounds (Table 5). White shrimp 
landings were slightly higher for all size 
Table 4.-Distribution of brown shrimp landings (in thousands of pounds), 
Depth Discards Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Total 
Pre·c1osure simulation 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 216 0 4 217 466 1,946 1,995 4,627 
3 413 0 2 31 44 70 22 170 
4 783 20 311 992 290 241 6 1,860 
5 678 357 2,045 4,797 967 219 0 8,386 
6 285 665 3,002 4,298 1,129 90 0 9.184 
White shrimp 7 32 862 2,197 1,521 183 10 0 4,773 
8 1 1,998 2,168 641 19 0 0 4,826 
Pre-closure Closure Pre­ Pre·closure Closure Pre-
Depth days days closure days days closure Total 2,408 3,902 9,729 12,497 3,098 2,576 2,023 33,826 
zone fished fished inflated fished fished inflated 
Closure simulation 
1 a a a a a a 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a 
2 2,305 9,629 9,629 7,143 9,321 9,321 2 42 a 4 217 466 1,946 2,169 4,801 
3 281 697 281 3,462 4,003 3,579 3 281 a 3 58 62 217 151 490 
4 2,137 3,345 2,325 7,400 9,707 8,052 4 213 24 421 1,173 249 761 48 2,676 
5 11,372 11,077 12,374 996 999 1,084 5 173 333 1,989 4,447 693 574 a 8,036 
6 12,807 10,708 13,935 182 248 198 6 41 749 2,854 2,956 552 158 a 7,269 
7 7,881 7,363 8,575 32 50 34 7 9 907 2,457 1,489 112 20 a 4,985 
8 8,593 11,558 9,350 26 59 28 8 1 2,389 3,598 1,176 17 1 a 7,180 
Total 45,376 54,377 56,469 19,241 24,387 22,296 Total 760 4,402 11,326 11,516 2,151 3,677 2,368 35,437 
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Table 5.-Distribution of white shrimp landings (in thousands of pounds). to a minor increase in costs and a sub­

Depth Discards Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Total stantial increase in landings and rev­

enue, which translated into a $4.855
Pre·closure simulation 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 million increase in rent. Even though 
2 300 84 880 1,817 980 1,323 504 5,588 out-of-state vessels (vessel class 3) in­3 399 325 498 440 252 154 18 1,686
 
4 182 819 1,365 966 300 101 2 3,554 curred a substantial increase in vari­

5 5 160 184 137 68 2 0 552 
6 0 43 29 17 9 0 0 98 able costs under the closure simulation, 
7 0 9 2 1 0 0 0 12 these costs were more than offset by 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 increases in landings and revenue, such 
Total 886 1,440 2,958 3,378 1,609 1,580 524 11,490 that vessel class 3 realized a $2.042 
Closure simulation million increase in rent. 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 In the base simulation, with rent to 2 219 84 880 1,817 980 1,323 585 5,669 
3 0 410 509 454 285 424 190 2,271 the fishery equal to zero, rent for brown 
4 0 904 1,471 1,224 440 384 38 4,462 
5 0 111 196 120 65 5 0 497 shrimp was -$0.557 million and rent 
6 0 19 19 11 10 0 0 58 for white shrimp was $0.557. Under the 
7 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 10 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 closure simulation, rent for brown 
shrimp increased to $7.438 million (a Total 219 1,537 3,076 3,626 1,780 2,136 813 12,967 $7.995 million increase) and rent for 
white shrimp fell to -$0.382 million (a 
$0.939 million decrease). Total rent to 
classes, though most of the increase in pounds. These results indicate that dis­ vessel owners under the closure simula­
total landings came from the two small­ cards were traded for landings when tion was $7.056 million, with about 71 % 
est size classes (sizes 5 and 6). White the count laws were repealed. of the rent going to Texas vessels and 
shrimp discards were 0.885 million 29% to out-of-state vessels. When the Economicspounds under the pre-closure simula­ $1.851 million increase in crew rent8 
tion and 0.219 million pounds under Cost and returns information for the was added to owners' rent, the total in­
the closure simulation. When the simu­ pre-closure and closure simulations, crease in economic rent attributable to 
lation was performed under closure ef­ categorized by vessel class and shrimp the closure was $8.907 million. 
fort patterns but with the old count species, is outlined in Tables 6 and 7. 
laws, total landings fell by 0.8 million For vessel class I, the $0.159 million 
pounds and discards increased by the increase in rent under the closure simu­ 'The model takes into account the number of 
crew members for each vessel and the percent­same amount. Under the pre-closure lation was primarily due to a slight in­
age of revenues attributable to the crew. Because 
simulation with no count laws (other crease in landings and revenue, as fixed the model assumes all vessels are owner-oper­
than the fall inshore count law), land­ and variable costs remained relatively ated, vessel class I (unregistered inshore boats) 
has 0 crew members and 0% crew share. Vessel ings increased 0.5 million pounds and constant. For vessel class 2, fishing pat­ classes 2 and 3 both have 2 crew members who 
discards decreased by 0.5 million terns under the closure simulation led receive a 20% share of revenues. 
Table 6.-Pre-closure simulation (all values in thousands except days fished and Table 7.-200-mile, 45-day closure simulation, 4-fathom zone open (all values in 
price/pound). thousands except days fished and price/pound). 
Vessel owners' costs and returns Vessel owners' costs and returns 
Item 
Vessel class 
2 
Shrimp species 
Brown White 
Total 
owners Item 
Vessel class 
2 3 
Shrimp species 
Brown White 
Total 
owners 
Days fished 
Price/pound 
Landings 
Revenue 
Variable cost 
Fixed cost 
Total cost 
Rent 
16,286 
1.84 
7,829 
14,414 
3,241 
11,173 
14,414 
0 
54,859 
3.29 
32,581 
107,294 
64,990 
42,304 
107,294 
0 
7,619 
3.31 
4,907 
16,257 
16,257 
0 
16.257 
0 
56,468 
3.05 
33,827 
103,057 
65,038 
38,576 
103,614 
-557 
22,296 
3.04 
11,490 
34,908 
19,450 
14,901 
34,351 
557 
78,764 
3.04 
45.317 
137,965 
84,488 
53,477 
137,965 
0 
Days tished 
Price/pound 
Landings 
Revenue 
Variable cost 
Fixed cost 
Total cost 
Rent 
16.203 
1.81 
8,039 
14.557 
3.225 
11,173 
14,398 
159 
54,456 
332 
34,096 
113,138 
65,979 
42,304 
108,283 
4,855 
8,106 
3.18 
6,270 
19,948 
17,906 
0 
17,906 
2,042 
54,378 
309 
35,437 
109,646 
65,259 
36,949 
102,208 
7,438 
24,387 
293 
12,968 
37.997 
21,851 
16,528 
38.379 
-382 
78,765 
3.05 
48,405 
147.643 
87,110 
53,477 
140,587 
7,056 
Crews' costs and returns Crews' costs and returns 
Vessel class Vessel class 
lIem 2 3 Crews + owners Item 2 3 Crews + owners 
Revenue 21,459 3,251 Revenue 22,628 3,990 
Variable cost 652 98 Variable cost 682 125 
Fixed cost 20,807 3,153 Fixed cost 20,807 3,153 
Total cost 21,459 3,251 Total cost 21.489 3,278 
Rent o o o Rent 1,139 712 8,907 
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200-mile, 4S-day Closure, 
4-fathom Zone Closed 
The Texas Parks and Wildlife De­
partment recently modified the Texas 
closure to include closure of the 4­
fathom zone offshore. This narrow, 
near-shore depth zone remained open 
to daytime white shrimp fishing during 
the Texas closure until 1990. Effort data 
in the previous simulation included il­
legal effort exerted in offshore waters 
during the closure. This analysis closed 
all offshore waters to shrimping from 
1 June through 15 July and assumed 
100% compliance by fishermen. 
Closing the 4-fathom zone in con­
junction with the EEZ closure caused 
a $0.103 million drop in rent for ves­
sel class 1 (compared to the EEZ clo­
sure with the 4-fathom zone open) due 
to a greater decline in revenue than to­
tal cost (Table 8). Vessel class 2, on 
the other hand, benefited from a de­
cline in total costs which more than 
offset the drop in revenue, and rent in­
creased by $1.182 million. Out-of-state 
vessels also experienced a cost savings 
greater than the loss in revenue, and 
rent to vessel class 3 increased by 
$0.679 million. 
Landings of brown shrimp fell by 
610,000 pounds and revenue remained 
almost unchanged (due to a higher price 
per pound), but a decline in total costs 
resulted in a $2.102 million increase in 
rent for this species. Though the white 
shrimp fishery also experienced a drop 
in total costs, it was not enough to off­
set the decline in landings and revenue, 
and rent to the white shrimp fishery 
fell by $0.344 million. Total rent to ves­
sel owners increased $1.758 million to 
$8.814 million under this scenario. Rent 
to crew members decreased $0.219 mil­
lion because of the decline in landings. 
Total rent to the fishery was $10.446 
million, a $1.63 million increase over 
the EEZ closure with the 4-fathom area 
open. 
200-mile, 4S-day Closure, 
4-fathom Zone Closed, 
Effort Redirected Inshore 
When the closure regulation first 
went into effect in 1981, effort in the 
4-fathom zone expanded. It was as­
sumed closing the 4-fathom zone would 
lead to a redirection of effort into the 
inshore waters. For this simulation 
only vessels that were fishing in both 
the 4-fathom zone and inshore waters 
were allowed to redirect effort (from 
the 4-fathom zone to inshore waters). 
Compared to the prior simulation 
(without redirected effort), landings and 
revenue for vessel class 1 declined 
slightly, total costs rose, and rent to 
vessel class 1 fell $0.189 million to ­
$0.133 million (Table 9). Even though 
landings increased, vessel class 2 in­
curred a decline in revenue because the 
increase in landings was made up of 
smaller shrimp from inshore waters. 
Coupled with an increase in total cost, 
due to more days fished, vessel class 2 
lost $1.08 million in rent. Landings and 
revenue for vessel class 3 declined 
costs remained stable, and rent fell b; 
$0.181 million. 
Though landings of brown shrimp 
increased slightly, the drop in revenue 
and increase in total cost led to a $1.503 
million loss in rent to the brown shrimp 
fishery. Only the white shrimp fishery 
benefited under this simulation. Land­
ings were virtually unchanged, but 
the decline in total cost was greater 
than the fall in revenue, which resulted 
in a $0.053 million boost in rent. Ves­
sel owners' rents under this scenario 
shrank to $7.364 million, compared to 
$8.814 million under the previous 
simulation, for a $1.45 million loss due 
to redirection of effort to inshore wa­
ters. As with vessel owners, crews' rev­
enues dropped due to landings of 
smaller, less valuable shrimp. When the 
crews' economic losses were added to 
the vessel owners' losses, rent fell from 
$10.446 million (under the previous 
simulation) to $8.847 million, for a 
$1.599 million loss in economic rents 
to the fishery. Compared to the first 
closure simulation, closing the 4­
fathom zone and redirecting effort 
Table 8.-200-mile, 45-day closure simulation, 4-fathom zone closed (all values in Table 9.-200-mile, 45-day closure simulation, 4-fathom zone closed, effort redi· 
thousands except days fished and price/pound). rected Inshore (all values In thousands except days fished and price/pound). 
Vessel owners' costs and returns Vessel owners' costs and returns 
Vessel class Shrimp species 
Item 2 
Days fished 16,049 51.970 
Price/pound 1.80 3.36 
Landings 8,000 33,396 
Revenue 14,423 112,228 
Variable cost 3,194 63,887 
Fixed cost 11,173 42,304 
Totai cost 14,367 106,191 
Renl 56 6,037 
3 Brown White 
7.574 52,079 23,514 
3.22 3.15 2.89 
6,119 34,827 12,688 
19.681 109,652 36,680 
16.960 63,128 20,913 
0 36.984 16,493 
16,960 100,112 37,406 
2,721 9,541 -726 
Crews' costs and returns 
Vessel class Shrimp species 
Total 
owners Item 2 3 Brown White 
75.593 Days fished 16,204 52,827 7,590 53,054 23,567 
3.08 Price/pound 1.80 3.33 3.22 3.12 2.88 
47,515 Landings 7,944 33,567 6,054 34,879 12,686 
146,332 Revenue 14,265 111,694 19,481 108,855 36,585 
84,401 Variable cost 3,225 64,433 16,941 63,638 20,961 
53,477 Fixed cost 11,173 42,304 0 37,180 16,297 
137,518 Total cost 14,398 106,737 16,941 100,818 37.258 
8,814 Rent -133 4,957 2,540 8,037 -673 
Crews' costs and returns 
Total 
owners 
76,621 
3.06 
47,565 
145,440 
84,599 
53,477 
138,076 
7,364 
Vessel class Vessel class 
Item 2 3 Crews + owners Item 2 3 Crews + owners 
Revenue 22,446 3,936 Revenue 22,339 3,896 
Variable cost 668 122 Variable cost 671 121 
Fixed cost 20,807 3,153 Fixed cost 20,807 3,153 
Total cost 21,475 3,275 Total cost 21,478 3,274 
Rent 971 661 10,446 Rent 861 622 8,847 
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yielded a $0.308 million increase in 
rent to vessel owners and a $0.368 mil­
lion decrease in rent to crews. The net 
effect was a $0.060 million loss in rent 
to the fishery. 
ZOO-mile, 60-day Closure, 
4-fathom Zone Closed 
This simulation extended the closure 
period to 60 days, from 15 May to 15 
July, closed all offshore waters includ­
ing the 4-fathom zone, and allowed no 
illegal effort. It is the same scenario as 
the second simulation (to which it will 
be compared), except the closure lasted 
60 days instead of 45. 
Vessel class I was virtually unaf­
fected by the 15-day extension (Table 
10). Landings for vessel class 2 de­
clined, and even though they received 
a higher price per pound for their 
shrimp, revenue also fell. The decline 
in days fished however, translated into 
a considerable reduction in total oper­
ating costs which more than made up 
for the drop in revenue, and this vessel 
class realized an increase in rent of 
about $1.09 million. Landings and rev­
enue for vessel class 3 increased, costs 
remained stable, and rent increased by 
$0.484 million. 
Landings decreased for both brown 
and white shrimp. Revenue from white 
shrimp declined, but revenue from 
brown shrimp increased because of the 
higher price per pound received for 
larger shrimp. Rent to the brown shrimp 
fishery increased by $1.953 million and 
rent to the white shrimp fishery de­
creased by $0.374. The increase in rent 
to vessel owners was $1.579 million, 
for a total of $10.393 million. When 
crews' rents were added to owners' 
rents, total rent to the fishery climbed 
to $11.984 million, which was $1.538 
million more than the same scenario 
under a 45-day closure. Compared to 
the first closure simulation, rent to ves­
sel owners was $3.337 million higher, 
rent to crews was $0.260 lower, and 
the net increase in rent from closing 
the 4-fathom zone for 60 days was 
$3.077 million. 
ZOO-mile, 60-day Closure, 
4-fathom Zone Closed, 
Effort Redirected Inshore 
This simulation was the same as the 
previous analysis but allowed some ef­
fort to be redirected to inshore waters. 
Compared to the prior simulation, re­
direction of effort caused a reduction 
in net economic benefits. Days fished 
for vessel class 1 increased, total costs 
rose, landings and revenue fell, and rent 
dropped to -$0.176 milJion, a $0.237 
million loss (Table II). Vessel class 2 
was hurt the most by redirected effort. 
Days fished and total costs increased, 
revenue declined due to a lower aver­
age price per pound for shrimp, and 
rent fell by $1.49 million to $5.637 mil­
lion. For vessel class 3, costs remained 
stable, revenue declined, and rent fell 
by $0.254 million. 
The results by species revealed al­
most no change for white shrimp but a 
considerable change for the brown 
shrimp fishery. A lower price per 
pound, reduced revenue, and increased 
costs due to more days fished resulted 
in a $2.0 million loss in rent to the 
brown shrimp fishery. Rent to vessel 
owners was $8.413 million, a $1.981 
million decline. Crews' economic rent 
also shrunk under this simulation such 
that the total loss in rent from redi­
rected effort was $2.202 million. Al­
though total rent to the fishery fell from 
$11.983 million to $9.782 million be­
cause of redirected effort, it remained 
$0.875 million higher than under the 
first closure simulation. 
Conclusions 
The I-year impact analysis of the 
Texas closure (45 days, 4-fathom zone 
open) revealed a positive effect on all 
vessel classes (some more than others) 
and on all crews; the total gain in rent 
from the closure was $8.907 million. 
Closing the 4-fathom zone and extend­
ing the closure to 60 days increased 
rent to the fishery by more than $3 mil­
lion (compared to the 45-day closure 
Table 10.-200·mile, 50-day closure simulation, 4-fathom zone closed (all values in Table 11.-200-mile, 50-day closure simUlation, 4-falhom zone closed, eHort redj­
thousands except days fished and price/pound).
 
Vessel owners' costs and returns
 
Vessel class Shrimp species 
Item 2 3 Brown White 
Days fished 16,037 49,784 7,512 50,613 22,720 
Price/pound 1.80 3.41 3.23 3.20 2.86 
Landings 8,000 32,739 6,240 34,677 12,302 
Revenue 14,425 111,486 20,172 110,880 35,203 
Variable cost 3,191 62,055 16,967 62,249 19,964 
Fixed cost 11,173 42,304 0 37,138 16,339 
Total cost 14,364 104,359 16,967 99,387 36,303 
Rent 61 7,127 3,205 11,493 -1,100 
Crews' costs and returns 
Vessel class 
rected inshore (all values in thousands except days fished and price/pound). 
Vessel owners' costs and returns 
Total 
owners Item 
Vessel class 
2 3 
Shrimp species 
Brown White 
Total 
owners 
73,333 
3.11 
46,979 
146,083 
82,213 
53,477 
135,690 
10,393 
Days fished 
Price/pound 
Landings 
Revenue 
Variable cost 
Fixed cost 
Total cost 
Rent 
16,204 
1.80 
7,919 
14,222 
3,225 
11,173 
14,398 
-176 
50,890 
3.36 
32,974 
110,678 
62,737 
42,304 
105,041 
5,637 
7,529 
3.23 
6,146 
19,879 
16,928 
0 
16,928 
2,951 
51,790 
3.16 
34,738 
109,671 
62,833 
37,345 
100,178 
9,493 
22,833 
2.85 
12,301 
35,108 
20,057 
16,132 
36,189 
-1,081 
74,623 
3.08 
47,039 
144,779 
82,890 
53,477 
136,367 
8,412 
Crews' costs and returns 
Vessel class 
Item 2 3 Crews + owners Item 2 3 Crews + owners 
Revenue 22,297 4,034 Revenue 22,136 3,976 
Variable cost 655 125 Variable cost 659 123 
Fixed cost 20,807 3,153 Fixed cost 20,807 3,153 
Total cost 21,462 3,278 Total cost 21,466 3,276 
Rent 835 756 11,984 Rent 670 700 9,782 
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with the 4-fathom area open) and re­
duced discards to 42,000 pounds. This 
closure scenario seems to represent the 
best alternative for achieving the ob­
jectives of the closure management 
policy: Elimination of discards and in­
creasing the value of the brown shrimp 
harvest. When effort was redirected to 
inshore waters, benefits of the 60-day 
closure declined, but were still greater 
than the benefits from the original clo­
sure. The only segment of the fishery 
which did not benefit from the 60-day 
closure was the crew. All four scenarios 
that closed the 4-fathom zone left the 
crews worse off than the original Texas 
closure. 
Relevant to any discussion of policy 
analysis must be consideration of what 
happens in the industry when you make 
vessel owners better off. In the Gulf of 
Mexico shrimp fishery, the objectives 
are to implement management policies 
which increase economic benefits to the 
participants and to society as a whole. 
In an open-access fishery such as the 
Gulf shrimp fishery, it is useful to con­
sider the implications of increasing eco­
nomic rents to the participants. As rents 
rise, due to a price increase or a new 
policy, it is likely that effort will ex­
pand and absorb the excess profit until 
the fishery reaches a new equilibrium 
and rent is again driven to zero. With­
out some form of effort limitation or 
limited entry program, any policy that 
generates an increase in rent for the 
fishery will be short-lived in its effec­
tiveness. 
The above discussion assumes that 
inshore effort, environmental condi­
tions, prices, and unit costs are all held 
constant. In the real world, however, 
these elements are not held constant 
and an expansion of effort may not be 
the result. For example, Griffin and 
Beattie (1978) examined the impact of 
closing Mexico's 200-mile offshore 
fishing zone on the U.S. Gulf of 
Mexico shrimp fishery. Their results in­
dicated a negative impact on the 
shrimp fleet, which implied vessels 
would leave the industry in the long 
run. However, because of the price 
structure at that time (high price for 
shrimp, low cost for fuel) and the back­
log of orders for new vessels, they con­
cluded that shrimp fishermen were 
making large enough profits to with­
stand being shut out of Mexican wa­
ters and still remain profitable. Thus, 
even though the closure of Mexico's 
waters had a negative impact on the 
U.S. Gulf shrimp fleet, market condi­
tions at that time were so favorable that 
the industry expanded anyway, though 
it expanded less than it would have jf 
Mexican waters had remained open. 
The Texas closure had the same type 
of effect, but in the opposite direction. 
Inshore effort increased dramatically 
during 1979-85, which implies that 
fewer brown shrimp reached offshore 
waters. Second, double-digit inflation 
in the late 1970's and early 1980's 
caused unit costs of shrimping to in­
crease. Third, shrimp culture was rap­
idly expanding around the world, and 
the increase in U.S. shrimp imports 
caused the price of shrimp to remain 
relatively constant while unit costs in­
creased. Thus, unfavorable conditions 
put pressure on vessels to exit the in­
dustry, whereas the effects of the Texas 
closure would induce vessels to enter 
the industry. 
Literature Cited 
Blomo, V. J., K. Stokes, W. Griffin, W. Grant, 
and J. Nichols. 1978. Bioeconomic modeling 
of the Gulf shrimp fishery: An application to 
Galveston Bay and adjacent offshore areas. S. 
J. Agric. Econ. 10(1):119-125. 
----, J. ichols, W. Griffin, and W. Grant. 
1982. Dynamic modeling of a natural resource 
problem: Eastern Gulf of Mexico shrimp 
fishery. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 64(3):475-482. 
Cody, T. 1., R. P. Campbell, P. C. Hammerschmidt, 
G. C. Matlock, C. E. Bryan, 1. E. Clark, and 
L. S. Procarione. 1989. Texas shrimp fishery 
management plan. Tex. Parks Wildl. Dep., 
Coast. Fish. Branch, Austin, 261 p. 
Grant, W. E., K. G. Isakson, W. L. Griffin. 1981. 
A general bioeconomic simulation model for 
annual-crop marine fisheries. Ecol. Modelling 
13:195-219. 
Griffin,	 W. L., and B. R. Beattie. 1978. Eco­
nomic impact of Mexico's 200-mile offshore 
fishing zone on the United States Gulf of 
Mexico shrimp fishery. Land Econ. 54(1):27­
38. 
----, J. P. Warren, and W. E. Grant. 1979. 
A bio-economic model for fish stock manage­
ment: The cephalopod fishery of northwest Af­
rica. Food Agric. Organ. U. ., U.N. Develop. 
Progr., CECAFfTECH/79/16 (En), 46 p. 
----, J. P. Nichols, W. E. Grant, and J. P. 
Warren. 1981. Analysis of management alter­
natives for the Texas shrimp fishery. Dep. 
Agric. Econ., Tex. Agric. Exper. Sta., Tex. 
A&M Univ., DIR 81-1, Staff Pap. 1,63 p. 
----and W. E. Grant. 1982. A bioeconomic 
analysis of a CECAF shrimp fishery. Food 
Agric. Organ. U.N., U.N. Develop. Progr., 
CECAFfTECH/82/41 (En), 89 p. 
----, C. Oliver, B. McCarl, G. Matlock, 
C. E. Bryan, R. Riechers, and J. Clark. 1990. 
Shrimp fisheries management to increase eco­
nomic returns. Pinal Rep. MARFIN Award 
NA88WC-H-MFI99 submitted to Natl. Mar. 
Fish. Serv., Southeast Reg. Off., St. Peters­
burg, Fla., 132 p. 
Klima, E. F, K. N. Baxter, F J. Patella, and G. 
A. Matthews. 1983. Review of the 1982 Texas 
closure for the shrimp fishery off Texas and 
Louisiana. U.S. Dep. Commer., NOAA Tech. 
Memo. NMFS-SEFC-I08, 63 p. 
----, ----, and 
----. 1984. Review of the 1983 Texas 
closure for the shrimp fishery off Texas and 
Louisiana. U.S. Dep. Commer., NOAA Tech. 
Memo. NMFS-SEFC-136, 63 p. 
----, K. N. Baxter, and F J. Patella. 1985. 
Review of the 1984 Texas closure for the 
shrimp fishery off Texas and Louisiana. U.S. 
Dep. Commer., NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS­
SEFC-156, 33 p. 
Nance, J. M., N. Garfield, and J. A. Paredes. 
1991. A demographic profile of participants 
in two Gulf of Mexico inshore shrimp fisheries 
and their response to the Texas closure. Mar. 
Fish. Rev. 53(1):10-18. 
Nichols, S. 1983. Impacts of the 1981 and 1982 
Texas closure on brown shrimp yields. U.S. 
Dep. Commer., NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS­
SEFC-IIO, 44 p. 
----. 1984. Impacts of the combined clo­
sures of the Texas territorial sea and FCZ on 
brown shrimp yields. Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv., 
Southeast Fish. Cent., Miami Lab., Miami Fla., 
17 p. 
----. 1985. Impacts of the Texas closure 
on brown shrimp yields: final report for 1983, 
preliminary report for 1984. Rep. prep. for 
Gulf Mex. Fish. Manage. Counc. NMFS 
Southeast Fish. Cent., Miami, Fla., 42 p. 
----. 1987. Impacts of the Texas closure 
on brown shrimp yields: Final report for 1985, 
preliminary report for 1986. Rep. prep. for 
Gulf Mex. Fish. Manage. Counc. NMFS 
Southeast Fish. Cent., Miami, Fla., 12 p. 
Poffenberger, J. R. 1982. Estimated impacts of 
the Texas closure regulation on ex-vessel prices 
and value, 1981 and 1982. U.S. Dep. Commer., 
NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS-SEFC-III, 34 p. 
----. 1984. Estimated impacts of the Texas 
closure regulation on ex-vessel prices and 
value, 1982 and 1983. U.S. Dep. Commer., 
NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS-SEFC-148, 21 p. 
----. 1986a. Estimated impacts of the 
Texas closure regulation on ex-vessel prices 
and value, 1984 and 1985. U.S. Dep. Commer., 
NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS-SEFC-184, 22 p. 
1986b. Economic impacts of the 
Texas closure regulation 1981-1985. Rep. 
prep. for Gulf Mex. Fish. Manage. Counc. 
NMFS Southeast Fish. Cent., Miami, Fla., 
63 p. 
----. 1986c. Economic impacts of the 
Texas closure regulation 1985-1986. Rep. 
prep. for Gulf Mex. Fish. Manage. Counc. 
NMFS Southeast Fish. Cent., Miami, Fla., 
36 p. 
Marine Fisheries Review 28 
